Background: In December 2009, when the H1N1 influenza pandemic appeared to be subsiding, public health offıcials and unvaccinated individuals faced the question of whether continued H1N1 immunization was still worthwhile.
Introduction

I
n December 2009, when the H1N1 influenza pandemic appeared to be subsiding, public health offı-cials and unvaccinated individuals faced the question of whether continued H1N1 immunization was still worthwhile. The limited time between the Northern Hemisphere's fırst "epidemic wave" in the spring of 2009 and the second epidemic wave in September-December 2009 left little time to surmount developmental, regulatory, and logistic hurdles involved in bringing the vaccine from its conception to the population. Despite massive efforts, large supplies of vaccine were still undelivered and much of the population had not yet been vaccinated as the second wave subsided. This same issue will likely occur in the future unless technologic advances help compress the novel influenza strain vaccine development timeline.
Central to the decision of whether to continue vaccination is the probability of vaccination mitigating a possible third epidemic wave occurring in January-March 2010. First, public health agencies were diverting staff and other resources to vaccination clinics, and these were resources unavailable for other programs and priorities. Continued prioritization of the H1N1 vaccination program had to be justifıed on the grounds of a likely positive benefıt to population health. Second, individuals receiving vaccinations also expended time-and sometimes out-of-pocket costs. So, if the threat of disease had passed, these expenditures were unwarranted. Third, acceptance of the H1N1 vaccination 1, 2 had been poor even when available during the fall of 2009 among some communities and populations. Continued urgings by public health offıcials when the threat of disease was substantially diminished would likely lessen their credibility with those groups.
Historically, there is evidence for multiple wave occurrences. Multiple waves have occurred [3] [4] [5] during previous influenza pandemics in 1918 and 1957 . The 1918 pandemic began with a herald wave in the spring, followed by a second surge of cases in October and then a third surge in February of 1919. The 1957 pandemic also included several pandemic waves: a series of small outbreaks over the summer of 1957 followed by a higher peak in October after children returned to school and then another wave of illness that afflicted the elderly in January and February of 1958. At the peak of the 1957 U.S. pandemic, less than half of the approximately 60 million doses produced had been delivered. This second surge subsided until January and February 1958, when another wave of illness afflicted the elderly. The 1968 -1970 pandemic 6 also had multiple waves: an initial milder wave in early 1968 followed by a more severe second wave in late 1968 -early 1969.
The mechanisms for these additional waves are still unclear. Moreover, epidemic waves are usually presented as aggregated national data. So the question remains, is it possible for a region that has experienced one or two previous waves to experience an additional wave, or did the previously observed third waves represent regions of the country experiencing the different waves of the epidemic at different time periods? If the former scenario occurred, then several possible mechanisms for a third wave exist:
• Seasonal forcing: Environmental changes (temperature, humidity, less sunlight or other factors) accompanying the transition from autumn to winter may increase the transmissibility of the virus or susceptibility to influenza. 
Methods
Model Structure and Synthetic Census-Based Population
A previously published study 11 provides details on the DC metropolitan region model, which encompassed the following fıve census metropolitan statistical areas:
The model consisted of a total of 7,414,562 computer "agents," mirroring the actual population of the DC metropolitan region. Each agent served as a virtual person, complete with a set of assigned sociodemographic characteristics and daily behaviors (e.g., age, gender, occupation, household location, household membership, school assignment for students and teachers, work location assignment for employed adults, work status as employed or unemployed, and disease status). 12 The count of households by size was as follows: 753,909 (26.4%) households had only a single occupant; 888,571 (31.1%) had two occupants; 490,984 (17.2%) had three occupants; 418,073 (14.6%) had four occupants; 189,606 (6.6%) had fıve occupants; 74,900 (2.6%) had six occupants; 43,146 (1.5%) had seven or more occupants. More than one third (36.9%) of households had children, with 448,099 (42.5% of households with children) having one child; 397,789 (37.7%) having two children; 148,116 (14.0%) having three children; 43,959 (4.2%) having four children; and the rest having fıve or more children. A majority of the households, 53.6%, had two adults whereas 33.8% had one adult and the rest had three or more.
Each simulation day, agents moved among the region's workplaces, schools, and community locations, similar to the movements of actual people. The day of the week and agent characteristics governed their movement and interaction with each other. A method modifıed from that developed by an earlier study 13 helped extract the agent population from U.S. Census Bureau's Public Use Microdata fıles and Census aggregated data. 12 The following data sources generated school and workplace locations and assignments: U.S. Department of Education National Center for Education Statistics (public schools data); private data vendor (private schools); U.S. Census Standard Tabulation Product (STP64) commuting pattern data; and ESRI Business Analyst (InfoUSA business data).
Disease Parameters and Model Calibration
Previous MIDAS models 8,9,11,14 -18 provided disease parameters and assumptions. In each individual, disease progressed through an underlying SEIR disease model. At the start of each simulation run, individuals who had already been vaccinated or infected (recently or remotely) began as recovered (R) from and therefore immune to infection. All other individuals were initially susceptible (S) to influenza. The start of each simulation run involved introducing an infectious seed (a set of 100 randomly chosen infectious agents) to generate the epidemic. Every susceptible individual who contacted an infectious individual had a probability of contracting influenza. 8, 19 Table 1 lists these probabilities. A newly infected agent then progressed into the exposed (E) state where the agent remained for the duration of the disease's incubation period and then to the infectious state (I) where the person could infect others. Agents remained in the infectious state for a period of 4 -7 days. 20 Half of infectious patients manifested symptoms, whereas the other half remained asymptomatic but could still transmit disease. An infected agent remained infectious for the duration of the infectious period before transitioning into the recovered state (R).
Initial model calibration utilized the approach employed by earlier studies 8, 9, 11, 15, 19 and targeted an epidemic with a daily reproductive rate (R 0 ) of 1.4 (Attack Rate [AR]ϭ33%; see below) as seen in the 1957-1958 pandemic. Additional runs used R 0 values of 1.2 and 1.7, corresponding to attack rates of 19% and 38%, respectively. The base-case scenario used the following assumptions from previous studies 8, 9, [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] : 20% of working adults work on weekends, 50% of symptomatic students and workers stayed home with no community contacts unless they saw a doctor, and 40% of symptomatic patients visited a clinic or emergency department.
Modeling Possible Third-Wave Mechanisms
Modeling the third-wave mechanisms entailed adjusting the following model components in various degrees, ways, and combinations:
• Daily reproductive rate (R 0 ): The reproductive rate is the expected number of additional new cases that a single infectious individual would generate if he or she entered a fully susceptible population, and can be adjusted to different levels each day. 26 The R 0 is directly related to the transmissibility of the virus.
• Cross-protection (x): Cross-protection is the degree to which a previously infected individual is immune to subsequent infection. When cross-protection is 100%, all previously infected individuals remain recovered and are immune to additional infection. Lowering the level of this variable allows previously infected individuals to be infected again. If x% is the degree of cross-protection, then each previously infected individual has a (1-x)% chance of being infected during an effective contact with an infectious individual.
• Opening and closing locations: Schools and workplaces can be opened and closed each day. When they are closed, agents that normally go to these locations and mix with each other instead stay at home and increase their community contacts by 20%. 24 The third-wave mechanisms were as follows:
• Seasonal forcing: Seasonal forcing entails a gradual increase in viral transmissibility as time progresses from the autumn to the winter. The exact mechanism and degree to which this may happen is unclear. To model gradually changing viral transmissibility, an equation was selected that would generate a gradually sloping curve and contain parameters that can allow us to alter the amplitude and slope of the curve. Previous studies 7,27 used sine/cosine functions to model seasonality. Similarly, the current study employed the following sine-wave function of time (t):
Y(t)ϭAsin(tϩ), where
A, the amplitude, is the peak deviation of the function from its center position;
, the angular frequency, specifıes how many oscillations occur in a unit time interval (in radians per unit of time);
, the phase, specifıes where in its cycle the oscillation begins at t ϭ 0.
For model simulations, Y(t) represents the transmission multiplier correction that describes the increase or decrease in seasonality as a function of time. The cycle (angular frequency) was the number of days in 1 year ( ϭ 1/365); the amplitude (A) was the increase/decrease from the initial R 0 level to the maximum R 0 level; and the phase shift () is the time (in days) that the seasonality multiplier begins to increase/decrease.
• Changes in social mixing: Closing and opening schools and workplaces allowed for the simulation of vacations and holidays that would affect agent movement and social contacts. For the purposes of simulating the November (Thanksgiving) and the winter holidays, simulation runs assumed that the epidemic began September 1, 2009, correlating to the second wave of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Additional scenarios explored the effects of increasing the amount of social mixing during the winter holidays, a time when contact between school-aged children and the elderly increases sharply. This simulated a relaxation of voluntary social distancing during the heart of the fırst wave.
• Viral adaptation: The influenza virus progressively changes so that it is more transmissible (increasing R 0 ); overcomes existing immunity (loss of cross-protection); or both.
• Immune escape variant: Either the original virus mutates substantially to become an effectively different virus, or a second completely distinct virus enters into the population. This mechanism can both increase R 0 and decrease cross-protection.
Vaccination
Vaccination schedules were then implemented in each of the third-wave scenarios to determine whether vaccination could mitigate the third wave. Each newly vaccinated susceptible (S) individual had a probability (i.e., vaccine effıcacy) of becoming recovered (R). Effıcacy of the one-dose vaccine was 80% for those aged Ն10 years and 50% for those aged Ͻ10 years. Effıcacy after a second vaccine dose 28, 29 was 80% for those aged Ͻ10 years. Additional sensitivity scenarios explored the effect of ranging vaccine effıcacy down to 50%. Each dose took 2 weeks after administration to achieve its effects. Although the recommended interval between the fırst and second dose of vaccine is approximately 4 weeks (21 or more days is considered acceptable) for children aged 6 months to 9 years, 30 the ideal time frame may vary on an individual basis. Moreover, some children will never receive a second dose of the vaccine. Different scenarios commenced vaccination at different points in the epidemic (8 weeks before the fall wave peak, 4 weeks prior to the peak, and concurrently with the peak). Sensitivity analyses explored changing the rates at which vaccination occurred (vaccination of the population was completed after 30, 90, and 180 days). The base case assumed 50% vaccine coverage; additional simulations ranged coverage down to 30% and 10% to span the values reported during the H1N1 pandemic. 1 Separate scenarios also explored 10 prioritizing versus not prioritizing the ACIP-recommended priority groups. 
Computational Specifics
The ABM was programmed in Cϩϩ. Simulations were performed at the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center on Axon, an Intel Xeonbased Infıniband cluster.
Results
All of the presented epidemic curves are the averages of 20 simulation runs that resulted in epidemics (i.e., the virus persists in the population for at least 20 days and infects at least 1000 individuals) after seeding the population with 100 randomly infected individuals. The continuous lines in the fıgures represent 4-day moving average trend lines, which smooth out irregular patterns produced by the weekend effect (i.e., students and workers having different weekend contact patterns).
Third-Wave Scenarios
The simulations assumed that the seeded epidemic was a second wave, such as occurred with H1N1 in the fall of 2009. The following combinations of mechanisms generated an additional epidemic wave thereafter:
• Increasing-viral-transmissibility: Baseline scenarios began the influenza virus as an R 0 ϭ1.2 (ARϭ19%) strain, which then changes to an R 0 ϭ2.0 on Day 120, as this is the lower limit estimated for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. 31 Additional scenarios began the influenza virus as R 0 ϭ1.4 and R 0 ϭ1.7 strains.
• Loss-of-cross-protection: The influenza virus begins as an R 0 ϭ1.2. On Day 120, a new strain, against which the individuals have 25% immunity, enters the population. This new strain also has an R 0 ϭ1.2. Additional scenarios began the influenza virus as R 0 ϭ1.4 and R 0 ϭ1.7 strains. Table 2 shows the effects of the various third-wave scenarios of overall and age-specifıc attack rates. Increasing the initial R 0 to 1.4 and 1.7 increased the overall attack rate, but decreased the additional wave attack rates, because increasing the R 0 consumes susceptible individuals faster, leaving fewer susceptible individuals to maintain an additional wave. For the increased-viral-transmissibility scenario, an unmitigated epidemic that starts at R 0 ϭ1.4 and then increases to R 0 ϭ2.0 generates an overall attack rate of 31.0% (0.5% additional wave) and one that starts at R 0 ϭ1.7 generates an overall attack rate of 38.2% (0.1% additional wave). For the loss-of-cross-protection scenario, an unmitigated epidemic that starts at R 0 ϭ1.4 generates an overall attack rate of 45.0% (14.6% additional wave) and one that starts at R 0 ϭ1.7 generates an overall attack rate of 56.1% (18.0% additional wave). For the changes-in-social-mixing scenario, an unmitigated epidemic that starts at R 0 ϭ1.4 generates an overall attack rate of 28.23% (0.26% additional wave) and one that starts at R 0 ϭ1.7 generates an overall attack rate of 37.43% (0.04% additional wave).
Of note, for two of the scenarios, the age distribution of cases changed from the initial wave (younger) to the additional wave (older). In the changing-viraltransmissibility scenario, the age distribution of cases for the initial wave versus the next wave was as follows: 11.7% vs 10.7% (aged Յ4 years); 40.4% vs 32.2% (aged 5-18 years); 6.2% vs 7.1% (aged 19 -24 years); 27.6% vs 32.9% (aged 25-49 years); 9.1% vs 11.02% (aged 50 -64 years); and 4.9% vs 5.9% (aged Ն65 years). In the loss-of-cross-protection scenario, the age distribution of cases for the initial wave versus the next wave was as follows: 11.8% vs 11.3% (aged Յ4 years); 40.5% vs 37.8% (aged 5-18 years); 6.2% vs 6.5% (aged 19 -24 years); 27.5% vs 29.4% (aged 25-49 years); 9.1% vs 9.8% (aged 50 -64 years); and 4.9% vs 5.2% (aged Ն65 years). This is primarily because children, who have high levels of mixing, are infected early in the epidemic, leaving an increased number of older individuals as susceptibles.
However, for the changing-social-mixing scenario, the age distribution grew slightly younger: 11.7% vs 11.7% (aged Յ4 years); 34.7% vs 39.5% (aged 5-18 years); 7.1% vs 6.3% (aged 19 -24 years); 30.9% vs 28.1% (aged 25-49 years); 10.2% vs 9.4% (aged 50 -64 years); and 5.4% vs 5.0% (aged Ն65 years). This is because changes in socialmixing patterns are more likely to affect school-aged children who are high mixers, particularly at schools. 32 The Effects of Vaccination in Mitigating Third Waves Table 2 and Figures 1-3 show the effects of vaccination on the different "third-wave" scenarios. As can be seen, vac- cination is effective in mitigating all three additional wave scenarios, even when vaccination takes as long as 180 days to complete (assuming 50% vaccine coverage). In all cases, initiating vaccination earlier and increasing the level of vaccination can further decrease the overall attack rate. Figure 2 (the loss-of-cross-protection scenario) illustrates how vaccination can mitigate the intensity of an additional wave caused by a new virus strain against which the vaccine has only 75% of baseline vaccine effıcacy. Table 2 shows results when ACIP-recommended groups are not prioritized for immunization. Simulation runs that vaccinated ACIP priority groups fırst, especially school-aged children who are high mixers, achieved greater mitigation of an additional wave: an up to a 1% decrease in the overall attack rates. Table 2 shows results when it takes 3 months to achieve target coverage of the population. Decreasing this time to 30 days results in an additional 1.1%-2.8% decrease in the increased-viraltransmission scenario, a 1.1%-2.4% decrease in the lossof-cross-protection scenario, and a 0.2%-1.1% decrease in the change-in-social-mixing scenario in the overall attack rates. Increasing the time to 180 days boosts the attack rates by 1.9%-2.6% in the increased-viraltransmission scenario, 2.2%-3.9% in the loss-of-crossprotection scenario, and a 0.5%-1.5% in the changein-social-mixing scenario.
Ranging vaccine effıcacy down to 50% and vaccine coverage down to 30% did not signifıcantly affect the current results. However, further decreasing vaccine coverage to 10% did decrease the effectiveness of the vaccination program, increasing (compared to when vaccine coverage was 30%) the overall attack rate by 5.41% and the additional wave attack rate by 5.35% in the increasedviral-transmissibility scenario; 4.3% and 4.1% in the lossof-cross-protection scenario; and 0.68% and 0.90% in the change-in-social-mixing scenario, respectively.
Vaccination in higher R 0 scenarios (i.e., 1.4 and 1.7) had some varying effects. For the increased-viraltransmissibility scenario, because increasing the initial R 0 substantially reduced the size of the additional wave, vaccination had little effect. For the loss-of-cross-protection scenario, initiating vaccination 4 weeks prior to the fırst peak (completing the vaccination program in 3 months) in an epidemic that starts at R 0 ϭ1.4 then increases to R 0 ϭ2.0 cuts the overall attack rate from 45.0% to 25.5% (the additional wave from 14.6% to 3.3%). In one that starts at R 0 ϭ1.7, vaccination cuts the overall attack rate from 56.1% to 45.0% (the additional wave from 18.0% to 12.4%). For the change-in-social-mixing scenario, initiating the same type of vaccination program in an epidemic that starts at R 0 ϭ1.4 cuts the overall attack rate from 28.23% to 21.51% (the additional wave from 0.26% to 0.01%). In one that starts at R 0 ϭ1.7, vaccination cuts the overall attack rate from 37.43% to 32.34% (the additional wave from 0.04% to 0%).
Discussion
The study delineated circumstances under which vaccination after an epidemic peak still confers substantial benefıt. A vaccination program initiated too late to affect an epidemic's initial wave could still mitigate a possible additional wave even when the virus adapts or mutates considerably. This supports continuing a vaccination program during the waning of an epidemic, as in December 2009 -January 2010. Although vaccinating a population before an epidemic begins is ideal, public health decision makers should not rule out initiating a vaccination program when they know that the vaccine will not arrive in time. Study results also suggest that adhering to vaccinating ACIP priority individuals fırst, even late in a pandemic, may be benefıcial.
Covering an entire population before an epidemic begins is very diffıcult, as getting new vaccines developed, tested, approved, distributed, and administered in a very short time frame is a prodigious task. This was clearly evidenced during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. Despite swift decision making in the spring of 2009, the fırst vaccines did not arrive until October 2009, after the fall wave had started in August-September 2009. Nevertheless, vaccine production and arrival was much more prompt than in past pandemics. Inactivated influenza vaccines were fırst available in the U.S. in 1945, and production still requires 3-6 months after strain selection, which makes the production of a new monovalent vaccine in time for use in a pandemic challenging. 33 Historical records 34 suggest that vaccination in previous pandemics was limited because of vaccine shortages prior to the epidemic peak combined with poor vaccine uptake. In 1957, the new monovalent vaccine was available 3 in small amounts by the end of August and not widely available until after October when the epidemic had already had peaked. Similarly, in 1968 -1969, the vaccine strain was identifıed 34 only 4 months before the peak of the epidemic in the U.S. Therefore, until the vaccine development process is substantially compressed, public health decision makers may face similar situations in the future.
Although the present study showed the potential benefıt of continuing a vaccination program, the exact expected value cannot be quantifıed because the likelihood of the proposed additional wave mechanisms is not known. Previous pandemics have demonstrated that additional waves can occur, but the causes of these waves remain unclear. Social-mixing data are limited. Failure to see additional waves in the 1937 H1N1 Manchester epidemic 35 may have been due to the social-distancing measures (e.g., quarantine) implemented. Studies 36 suggest that seasonal forcing alone can cause approximately a 20% increase in transmissibility. Moreover, it is not clear 37 how much of the impact of seasonal forcing is on the host versus the pathogen. In simulation experiments, viral adaptation and mutation were able to readily generate additional waves. However, to date, studies have not revealed convincing evidence of notable mutation during previous pandemics.
There is a scant amount of molecular data on the evolution of the 1918 H1N1 strain during its fırst decade. 38, 39 Although extensive phylogenetic analysis of the H2N2 1957 pandemic strain lineage revealed 40, 41 that the original strain diverged into two distinct co-circulating clades within 8 -10 years of its introduction, it has not shown that any of these changes occurred in [1957] [1958] . Given that the 2009 H1N1 virus received nearly all of its genes (except PB1) from viruses of recent non-human origin, 42, 43 it would not be surprising to see evolutionary rates exceeding those observed for seasonal H3N2 and H1N1. On the other hand, no notable antigenic shift has been detected so far in the evolution of H1N1 (2009), suggesting that reassortment of the surface glycoproteins similar to that observed during the fırst years of H2N2 is less likely.
Limitations
All computer models are simplifıcations of reality and can never account for every possible factor or interaction. Rather than make decisions, computer models provide information to decision makers about possible scenarios and relationships. An influenza pandemic and the resulting circumstances may not necessarily conform to the data and assumptions that the model drew from referenced sources or previously published models.
Conclusion
The present study identifıed potential mechanisms for a multiple-wave epidemic and demonstrated how vaccination can mitigate additional waves, thereby supporting the continuation of a vaccination program even when an epidemic appears to be waning, as in December 2009 -January 2010. Although vaccinating a population before an epidemic begins is ideal, public health decision makers should not rule out initiating a vaccination program even though they know that the vaccine will not arrive in time to affect the initial wave of an epidemic.
Uncertainties remain for decision making by public health offıcials on the question of dedicating resources and credibility to the H1N1 vaccination program. However, these simulations do lend support for continuation of the program and to continued public education on the benefıts of receiving the vaccine.
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